This is great. I have some questions and related comments.
Q1: Why do you keep talking about “a new left”?
Was the British New Left specifically looking to imagine a new left for their time? I know (generally) that they were looking for “third way” alternatives to imperialist capitalism and imperialist communism; the New Left was the relevant (and temporary) point of closure, i.e., the successful story they told.
My point here is that we should perhaps be looking for a third way and not yet worry about whether it will be left, center, or right. I think this is part of the more radical story you’re telling. We’re not choosing between democracy and communism, we’re seeking alternatives to pseudo-totalitarian crony capitalist Christian nationalist anti-public anti-urban democracy on the right and identity politics, virtue-signalling technocratic elitist anti-rural anti-religion anti-patriot democracy on the left. Maybe we need to jettison the thinking of “improving the left” for “seeking a new politics.”
I like this description of the new left’s affective heart; it sounds similar to your description of democracy. I wonder if, by linking this idea to a particular portion of the political spectrum, we exclude those who identify with the center or right but nonetheless agree entirely.
Q2: You write that an “absolutist teleology is a quest for a single final Truth and an end to politics… A relativist teleology makes all goals equal. It doesn’t matter what goal you seek as long as you have a goal.” Can you explain a bit more about why you think relativism is primarily (diagrammatically) teleological in character? I may be missing the obvious here. But I want to say that non-teleological relativism is ascendent in some ways, perhaps in the electorate’s exhaustion, resignation, and false-centrism. By non-teleological relativism – I know deontology is a word, but I don’t know that it captures my thought here – I mean the idea that there is no Truth and because of that, there are no ends beyond getting through the day. It’s not quite nihilism (which I understand as absolutist); maybe its more absurdist?
Q3: “The promise is neither a goal nor a mystery.” This idea trips me up; the idea that this particular promise is not a goal flies in the face of its Christianization. Accepting this as true, I wonder if this promise is not a goal because it is inevitable. Is it precisely inevitability which is the necessary condition for non-teleological diagrams? The diasporic diagram you describe takes suffering as its inevitability.
You note that “isn’t the return to the promised land a goal? Yes, but … The promise is known and concrete.” This seems wrong by your own reasoning. The promise is a certainty, an inevitability; it’s almost as if there’s no need to seek the promise because it’ll happen no matter what. It seems to me that tikkun olam has no telos because suffering can be diminished but never eradicated. Suffering is the condition of the kind of being we are, after all.
Q1. The British New Left certainly had a “left” politics in mind—a popular socialism, based to a large extent in a new reading of—and a new analysis based in—Marxism. They were deeply wedded to the left (even those who went on to articulate a non-marxist left, like Charles Taylor) because it was, at the time, understood as the critique of capitalism. And that was certainly one of their starting assumptions. But they talked about a popular and democratic socialism rather than communism. Is tikkun olam a socialist ethic? Is it the ethics of socialism?
You are right. Tikkun olam does not have a necessary political identification, at least not in terms of left and right. I do think there are conservatives who accept and practice it. So why call it a new left rather than, e.g., a third way? It is certainly looking for another foundation for politics, for another kind of politics. You are right to call it non-teleological but that is not sufficient.
Unfortunately, the “third way” is already strongly identified with Clinton and Blair. There is already a group of Democrats who refer to themselves as third way, and I think it tends to bring up connotations of compromise, of capitalism adapted to limited notions of democracy and social justice. The “middle way” won’t do any better, and besides, it brings up connotations of the Middle Passage. And the Russian political philosopher Dugin is already talking about a fourth way—a new imagination of empire).
I would love to find another name. I have been trying to find one for some time now and failing that, I fall back on the name I have used to identify my sense of political identification, although I am not sure how much that works anymore.
Q2. Forgive me. I was not clear enough. I did not mean to suggest that relativism is teleological. Only that there are some versions of teleology that are relativist.
Deontology implies that it is driven by a morality, and judgments are based in the reasons or intentions of the actor: are you doing it because it is a duty based in rules (think Kant).
Tikkun olam is an ethics that can be expressed in many moralities (just as there are many expressions of jewishness) and its judgments are based on consequences rather than intentions. You are not fulfilling your obligation if you do it because it is an obligation. A mitzvah is a good dead, not a judgment of people.
And that ethics is not relativist because it demands a collective effort to define and repair the present, and a practical means of doing so: an obligation to mitigate suffering. But it does not prejudge what suffering is, how to hear it, or how you mitigate it. So I would not describe it as relativist or situational, but contextual.
Q3. I assume a goal is something you strive for. Yahweh’s promise is not a telos because you cannot seek it, only hope for it (prayer). We do not have to do something for it to be fulfilled (but there is probably lots we can do that will delay it). We cannot approach it.
And there is nothing abstract or ideal about it (like salvation or communism), a mystery waiting to be filled in. It is as concrete and quotidian as “I will bring you a coffee.” You know exactly what it is being promised—simply the historical fact of the jews being returned to the promised land. And you will know it when it happens.
Is a promise inevitable? I don’t think so because there is no guarantee that it will be fulfilled. (Can God lie, forget, or change its mind?)
I think there are probably teleologies that think the goal is inevitable, but I need to think some more about apocalypse. My first guess is that there are teleological and non-teleological versions. Does it depend on whether it is something brought about by the actions of humans? Can there be a negative telos, something you would prefer to avoid (the end of the world) but think it is (almost) inevitable?
You are correct that mitigating suffering is not a telos because there is no end, and because all you can do is address concrete suffering in the present. Suffering may be inevitable but not because of some religious or ontological Truth or even natural law.
It is not an essence but an experience, a commonly shared material fact of humanity, which has always to be understood and located historically and contextually.
Does this clarify what I am proposing? Does this answer some of the problems you have identified? Have I addressed your questions to your satisfaction? Do you want to continue the conversation?
This is great. I have some questions and related comments.
Q1: Why do you keep talking about “a new left”?
Was the British New Left specifically looking to imagine a new left for their time? I know (generally) that they were looking for “third way” alternatives to imperialist capitalism and imperialist communism; the New Left was the relevant (and temporary) point of closure, i.e., the successful story they told.
My point here is that we should perhaps be looking for a third way and not yet worry about whether it will be left, center, or right. I think this is part of the more radical story you’re telling. We’re not choosing between democracy and communism, we’re seeking alternatives to pseudo-totalitarian crony capitalist Christian nationalist anti-public anti-urban democracy on the right and identity politics, virtue-signalling technocratic elitist anti-rural anti-religion anti-patriot democracy on the left. Maybe we need to jettison the thinking of “improving the left” for “seeking a new politics.”
I like this description of the new left’s affective heart; it sounds similar to your description of democracy. I wonder if, by linking this idea to a particular portion of the political spectrum, we exclude those who identify with the center or right but nonetheless agree entirely.
Q2: You write that an “absolutist teleology is a quest for a single final Truth and an end to politics… A relativist teleology makes all goals equal. It doesn’t matter what goal you seek as long as you have a goal.” Can you explain a bit more about why you think relativism is primarily (diagrammatically) teleological in character? I may be missing the obvious here. But I want to say that non-teleological relativism is ascendent in some ways, perhaps in the electorate’s exhaustion, resignation, and false-centrism. By non-teleological relativism – I know deontology is a word, but I don’t know that it captures my thought here – I mean the idea that there is no Truth and because of that, there are no ends beyond getting through the day. It’s not quite nihilism (which I understand as absolutist); maybe its more absurdist?
Q3: “The promise is neither a goal nor a mystery.” This idea trips me up; the idea that this particular promise is not a goal flies in the face of its Christianization. Accepting this as true, I wonder if this promise is not a goal because it is inevitable. Is it precisely inevitability which is the necessary condition for non-teleological diagrams? The diasporic diagram you describe takes suffering as its inevitability.
You note that “isn’t the return to the promised land a goal? Yes, but … The promise is known and concrete.” This seems wrong by your own reasoning. The promise is a certainty, an inevitability; it’s almost as if there’s no need to seek the promise because it’ll happen no matter what. It seems to me that tikkun olam has no telos because suffering can be diminished but never eradicated. Suffering is the condition of the kind of being we are, after all.
Thanks Nic. These are all good questions.
Q1. The British New Left certainly had a “left” politics in mind—a popular socialism, based to a large extent in a new reading of—and a new analysis based in—Marxism. They were deeply wedded to the left (even those who went on to articulate a non-marxist left, like Charles Taylor) because it was, at the time, understood as the critique of capitalism. And that was certainly one of their starting assumptions. But they talked about a popular and democratic socialism rather than communism. Is tikkun olam a socialist ethic? Is it the ethics of socialism?
You are right. Tikkun olam does not have a necessary political identification, at least not in terms of left and right. I do think there are conservatives who accept and practice it. So why call it a new left rather than, e.g., a third way? It is certainly looking for another foundation for politics, for another kind of politics. You are right to call it non-teleological but that is not sufficient.
Unfortunately, the “third way” is already strongly identified with Clinton and Blair. There is already a group of Democrats who refer to themselves as third way, and I think it tends to bring up connotations of compromise, of capitalism adapted to limited notions of democracy and social justice. The “middle way” won’t do any better, and besides, it brings up connotations of the Middle Passage. And the Russian political philosopher Dugin is already talking about a fourth way—a new imagination of empire).
I would love to find another name. I have been trying to find one for some time now and failing that, I fall back on the name I have used to identify my sense of political identification, although I am not sure how much that works anymore.
Q2. Forgive me. I was not clear enough. I did not mean to suggest that relativism is teleological. Only that there are some versions of teleology that are relativist.
Deontology implies that it is driven by a morality, and judgments are based in the reasons or intentions of the actor: are you doing it because it is a duty based in rules (think Kant).
Tikkun olam is an ethics that can be expressed in many moralities (just as there are many expressions of jewishness) and its judgments are based on consequences rather than intentions. You are not fulfilling your obligation if you do it because it is an obligation. A mitzvah is a good dead, not a judgment of people.
And that ethics is not relativist because it demands a collective effort to define and repair the present, and a practical means of doing so: an obligation to mitigate suffering. But it does not prejudge what suffering is, how to hear it, or how you mitigate it. So I would not describe it as relativist or situational, but contextual.
Q3. I assume a goal is something you strive for. Yahweh’s promise is not a telos because you cannot seek it, only hope for it (prayer). We do not have to do something for it to be fulfilled (but there is probably lots we can do that will delay it). We cannot approach it.
And there is nothing abstract or ideal about it (like salvation or communism), a mystery waiting to be filled in. It is as concrete and quotidian as “I will bring you a coffee.” You know exactly what it is being promised—simply the historical fact of the jews being returned to the promised land. And you will know it when it happens.
Is a promise inevitable? I don’t think so because there is no guarantee that it will be fulfilled. (Can God lie, forget, or change its mind?)
I think there are probably teleologies that think the goal is inevitable, but I need to think some more about apocalypse. My first guess is that there are teleological and non-teleological versions. Does it depend on whether it is something brought about by the actions of humans? Can there be a negative telos, something you would prefer to avoid (the end of the world) but think it is (almost) inevitable?
You are correct that mitigating suffering is not a telos because there is no end, and because all you can do is address concrete suffering in the present. Suffering may be inevitable but not because of some religious or ontological Truth or even natural law.
It is not an essence but an experience, a commonly shared material fact of humanity, which has always to be understood and located historically and contextually.
Does this clarify what I am proposing? Does this answer some of the problems you have identified? Have I addressed your questions to your satisfaction? Do you want to continue the conversation?